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The modem system of capital punishment diffuses and fragments the power
to decide who dies.1 Because the system is composed of multiple actors, no
single actor bears the burden of undivided power and responsibility. This
division of moral labor tempts actors at the front of the system, such as prose-
cutors and juries, to convince themselves that later actors will correct any error
in judgment they might happen to make. Yet later actors, such as state and
federal appellate courts, are in turn disinclined to upset decisions already made
and legitimized by a sequence of earlier actors.' Where power is divided,
responsibility shuffles to and fro in a fatal kind of perpetual motion, never
really settling anywhere. In the end, "nobody actually seems to do the killing."3
So long as the system's basic architecture remains unaltered, the power to
decide who dies will inescapably be dispersed. This Note therefore focuses on
the relative distribution of power within the system. It traces how the Supreme
1. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
AGENDA 95-106 (1986) (analogizing system to game of "chicken"); Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court:
The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1819 (1987) (describing how system
creates "shell game of moral accountability"). Stephen Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional
Accuracy at the Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1037, 1107-10 (1985)
(arguing undivided sentencer responsibility prerequisite for constitutionally accurate sentence); cf. MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 9 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979) (observing
that "[plunishment ... will tend to become the most hidden part of the penal process"); Robert Cover,
Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1626 (1986) ("The most elementary understanding of our social
practice of violence ensures that a judge know that she herself cannot actually pull the switch.").
2. Mello offers the following worst case scenario:
[A) jury recommendation of death despite some doubt, in the knowledge that the case will be
reviewed; judicial affirmation, based on deference to the jury's decision; a denial of clemency,
because the governor feels that the courts have spoken; execution, because if it was wrong
someone would have done something about it earlier in the process.
Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitutionality of Capital Statutes That
Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L. REV. 283, 327 (1989).
3. Jason DeParle, Louisiana Diarist: Killing Folks, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 1984, at 43, 43
(commenting on execution of Robert Wayne Williams in Louisiana electric chair); see also Jason DeParle,
Abstract Death Penalty Meets Real Execution, N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 1991, at E2 (suggesting Louisiana juries
refused to return death sentences after spate of recent executions). The petitioner in McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987), identified a problem similar to the one DeParle noticed. That is, the system produces
a pattern of racially discriminatory sentencing, even though, to paraphrase DeParle, "no one seems to do
the discriminating." Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding statistical evidence demonstrating
racially disparate sentencing insufficient to show equal protection or Eighth Amendment violation); Randall
L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1388, 1405 (1988) ("[Tlhe doctrine of purposeful discrimination insulates entirely many of the unconscious
ways in which prejudiced social values give rise to differential treatment on the basis of race.").
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Court's decisions in several recent capital cases have channelled power from
politically insulated actors to decisionmakers who are politically accountable,
who are more apt to respond to political-electoral, not moral, imperatives. Part
I details how the Court's modifications in its "evolving standards of decency"
doctrine and its new law of retroactivity have diverted to political actors more
power to develop the constitutional norms governing the application of the
death penalty. Once those norms have been specified, it still remains to be
decided who, within the constraints those norms impose, will be chosen to die.
Part II maps how the Court's ratification of "quasi-mandatory" statutes and its
gradual creation of an "appellate jury" have allocated greater influence to
politics to make this decision as well. Finally, Part III explores the constitution-
al and moral price paid when the power over both norm selection and death
selection is assigned to politics.
I. ALLOCATING NORM-SELECTION POWER TO POLITICS
The Eighth Amendment4 imposes substantive limitations on whom the
states may execute and procedural limitations on how they may select whom
to execute.6 The content of these limitations, however, has come to depend
increasingly not on the judgment of the federal courts, but on the verdict of
more politically responsive actors.
A. "Evolving Standards of Decency"
The role of the federal courts in capital sentencing is not to pass judgment
on the moral appropriateness of the sentence in any particular case. Rather, it
is to articulate the federal constitutional norms regulating the death penalty's
administration. Among the most important of these norms are those which place
limits on whom the state may render eligible for the death penalty. In the past,
the Supreme Court itself has assumed a fair share of the authority to articulate
these norms. Recently, however, the Court has displayed a noticeable readiness
to delegate to the states the power to determine whom the Eighth Amendment
immunizes from the death penalty. The vehicle for this trend has been a subtle,
though significant, modification in the "evolving standards of decency" doc-
trine,7 a doctrine the Court has developed to give meaning to the Eighth
4. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII.
5. See, e.g, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding death penalty dispropor-
tionate for rape of adult woman where victim not killed).
6. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding Georgia's guided
discretion death penalty statute).
7. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"); see also Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding execution of insane inconsistent with evolving standards); Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (holding mandatory death penalty inconsistent with evolving standards).
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Amendment's declaration that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted.
1. Two Approaches to the Constitutional Meaning of Cruel and Unusual
Punishments
The meaning of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments can be extracted using two different approaches. First, it may be
interpreted normatively: whether or not the Eighth Amendment prevents the
imposition of certain kinds of punishments or prevents the punishment of
certain kinds of offenses or offenders must be resolved through moral argu-
ment.8 Following this approach, the demands of the Eighth Amendment depend
upon critical morality, and the federal courts assume the burden of deciding
what critical morality requires. Alternatively, the Amendment may be interpret-
ed positively: the content of the ban on cruel and unusual punishments some-
how depends on conventional morality, requiring that the federal courts exercise
no independent moral judgment, but instead merely specify the criteria by
which the requirements of conventional morality are to be ascertained.
2. A Victory for Positivism
When the Court first turned its attention toward the Eighth Amendment's
bearing on the death penalty, some observers believed that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause would be interpreted normatively, 0 and certain
voices in the Court's fractured decision in Furman v. Georgia" heightened
expectations that this view might eventually prevail.12 In two recent cases,
however, it appears that a solid plurality of the Court has opted instead to
pursue a more positivistic approach. t3 In Stanford v. Kentucky, 4 the Court
8. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1039-42 (1978) (describing normative approach in
terms of arriving at "coherent moral position").
9. Some go so far as to urge that the Eighth Amendment's content should be gauged through reference
to some fixed historical standard. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S
OBSTACLE COURSE 8-9 (1982) (arguing Eighth Amendment bans only those punishments considered cruel
and unusual at time it was adopted).
10. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1778-98 (1970); Radin, supra note 8, at 1030, 1042-60.
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding death penalty, as then currently administered, cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment).
12. Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Al punishment must not by its severity be degrading to
human dignity."); id. at 371 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("In striking down capital punishment ... [w]e
achieve a major milestone in the road up from barbarism.") (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
13. The plurality consists of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice
O'Connor continues to believe that substantive Eighth Amendment analysis requires the Court to enter into
some form of normatively based proportionality review. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,382 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (O'Connor, J.). In neither Stanford
nor Penry, however, did Justice O'Connor find that the death penalty was always disproportionate for youths
or the mentally retarded. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Penry, 492 U.S. at 338
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concluded that society's evolving standards of decency had not matured to the
point where they would foreclose the execution of sixteen-year-olds. 15 Neither,
the Court concluded in Penry v. Lynaugh,16 had they reached the stage where
they eclipsed the execution of the retarded. 17
Both cases reveal a discernible effort by a plurality of the Court not only
to fix the content of the Eighth Amendment by employing objective criteria,
but, even more importantly, to reduce the range of permissible criteria to one.
Specifically, a plurality of the Court has resolved that the contours of the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments-leavened perhaps with
some reference to the behavior of capital sentencing juries-are to be defined
exclusively by the enactments of state legislatures. 8 According to Justice
Scalia, any indicator of national consensus other than legislative enactments
provides too uncertain a foundation upon which to ask the Court to rest consti-
tutional law. Underlying this skepticism is the fear that the considered judgment
of the Court would be no more than the sum of its members' naked prefer-
ences.1 9 Any consensus firm enough to warrant the Court's attention must be
manifest in state law. For the present, then, Stanford and Penr' mean the
decisions of state legislators, embodied in state statutes, will be treated as first
among equals, as occupying a privileged position against other indicia.20 And
(O'Connor, J.). In neither case, she reasoned, could it be said that all youthful offenders or all who labored
under some mental deficiency lacked the moral culpability necessary to make death fitting; accord
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 853 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
15. But cf. Thompson, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding Eighth Amendment prohibits
execution of person under age 16 at time of offense). See generally VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY
FOR JUVENILES 21-40 (1987) (arguing that Eighth Amendment principles prohibit execution of those under
age eighteen).
16. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
17. It remains open after Penry, however, whether or not the Eighth Amendment still prohibits the
execution of those who are so profoundly retarded that they are oblivious to the state's intention to execute
them. Cf. id. at 332-33.
18. Even though the Court's methodology relies on a relatively simple formula, disagreement can still
erupt. See, e.g., Thompson, 487 U.S. 815 (displaying disagreement over inclusion or exclusion of abolitionist
states when evaluating whether or not contemporary standards of decency prohibit execution of 15-year-
olds).
19. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 379 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia, together with Chief Justice
Rehnquist, aspires to anchor the Eighth Amendment in time through the concept of "unusualness," a notion
that hitherto has not received much attention. Before the Eighth Amendment is offended, they insist, a
punishment must be both "cruel" and "unusual." See Harmelin v. Michigan. 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2691 (1991)
(Scalia, J.); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378 (plurality opinion): Penry, 492 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). On this view, an admittedly cruel punishment is constitutionally permissible
so long as it is not "unusual." Thus, a cruel method of punishment is constitutional so long as it is "regularly
or customarily employed." See Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2691 (Scalia, J.) (citations omitted). The "parade
of horribles" this view naturally invites was dismissed by Justice Scalia, in part because he does not believe
the parade will "materialize." See id. at 2697 n. 11. Scalia adheres to this view even as he acknowledges
that what is today an overly imaginative parade of horribles may not look so horrible after the demos and
the Court have slid down tomorrow's slippery slope. See id.
20. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976))) ("'[Flirst' among the 'objective indicia that reflect the public
attitude toward a given sanction"' are statutes passed by society's elected representatives."). Justice
O'Connor, too, would give special respect to state legislative enactments. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 849
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should the current plurality crystallize into a majority, legislative enactments
most probably will become dispositive. By whatever mechanism our standards
of decency evolve, they will evolve independently of enlightenment from the
Court.
Labelling the plurality's approach "revisionist,"21 Justice Brennan pushed
in the opposite direction, trying to expand the range of relevant considerations
to include the "views of organizations with expertise in the relevant fields and
the choices of governments elsewhere in the world."22 In addition, he insisted
that the plurality's positive inquiry needed a normative supplement. Derived
from precedent, this supplement would oblige the Court to outlaw any punish-
ment that was disproportionate to the defendant's moral blameworthiness or
that served no legitimate penal goal.? The plurality's alternative view, Justice
Brennan predicted, would be the Eighth Amendment's requiem. Like any
provision of the Bill of Rights, the Eighth Amendment functions by imposing
limits on popular will. The methodology adopted in Stanford and Penry,
however, threatens to frustrate this function. For under the Stanford-Penry
approach, the Court has elected to "return the task of defining the contours of
the Eighth Amendment protection to political majorities."'24 Yet when a consti-
tutional right receives its content from state law, it deteriorates into "little more
than good advice." 5
B. Retroactivity after Teague
With its decisions in Stanford and Penry, the Court has quietly ceded to
state legislatures much of the power to fix the constitutional norms circumscrib-
ing the death penalty's substantive reach. In a parallel development, the Court
has, through recent innovations in the law of retroactivity, placed much of the
power to mold the federal norms governing the structure of the death-selection
process in the hands of state appellate courts. Ordinarily subject to popular
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing that decisions of state legislatures provide "most reliable signs of a
society-wide consensus").
21. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 391 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 384.
23. Id. at 383, 391-405; see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). But
see Harmelin, Ill S. Ct. at 2686 (Scalia, J.) (concluding "Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality
guarantee").
24. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 391 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note
10, at 1782 (interpreted positively, Eighth Amendment's "only function would be to legitimize advances
already made by the other departments [of governmentl and opinions already the conventional wisdom").
25. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,269 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958)). Thus, if enough state legislatures enact into law that "drug kingpins"
should die solely because they have trafficked in narcotics, it is difficult to imagine how the "evolving
standards of decency" doctrine could stay the executioner's hand. Cf. Sandra R. Acosta, Note, Imposing
the Death Penalty on Drug Kingpins, 27 HARM. J. ON LEGIS. 596, 606-10 (1990) (suggesting that death
penalty for drug kingpins may pass constitutional muster). Only the idea that such a penalty would be
disproportionate to the crime, an idea still viable but now largely limited to capital cases, see Harmelin,
Ill S. Ct. at 2701-02, could impede the state.
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selection and retention elections, these courts are more open to political forces
than their federal counterparts.
1. A New Vision of the Great Writ
In the past, death-sentenced prisoners frequently received relief in federal
court on habeas corpus after having exhausted state remedies.26 Moreover,
such relief was often based on Supreme Court decisions announced only after
the defendant has completed his direct appeal and his conviction has therefore
become final. In Teague v. Lane,27 a 1987 noncapital case, the Supreme Court
dramatically altered the existing habeas regime. Prior to Teague, the Court
would announce new rules of criminal procedure in one case and then decide
whether or not those rules should be given retroactive effect in either the same
case or a later case.as In Teague, the Court categorically held, with two narrow
exceptions, that new rules of criminal procedure would not be applied retroac-
tively on collateral appeal to any defendant whose conviction had become final
before the new rule was announced.29
Explicitly extended to capital petitioners in Penry v. Lynaugh,30 Teague's
nonretroactivity doctrine ordained a new understanding on the Court of the
function of the Great Writ. During the Warren Court era, habeas became a
vehicle for those held under state authority to challenge the constitutionality
of their convictions and sentences.31 This Warren Court vision began to
change with the emergence of the Burger Court.32 No longer a tool to be used
26. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (indicating that
70% of those capital defendants seeking habeas corpus in federal court obtained relief); David Bruck &
Leslie Harris, Habeas Corpse, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 15 & 22, 1991, at 10 ("In capital cases decided
over the past fifteen years, federal courts have found such violations in no fewer than 40 percent of the
convictions and sentences reviewed."); Rehnquist Urges Curb on Appeals of Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMIEs,
May 16, 1990, at Al ("In recent years, more than half of all state court death sentences have been
overturned by Federal courts during habeas corpus proceedings.").
27. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).
28. See, e.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 1 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 22A.1,
at 134 (Supp. 1991) (citing cases).
29. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
30. 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989).
31. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1963) (holding federal courts have "the
power-and, if the ends ofjustice demand, the duty-to reach the merits of claims on successive petitions");
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (holding federal claims cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings unless
petitioner "deliberately bypassed" independent and adequate state procedures for raising claims), overruled
by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963) (requiring
federal courts in habeas corpus to "hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a
full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court"); cf. Brown v. Alien, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (permitting
relitigation in federal court of constitutional claims decided in state court). See generally Robert M. Cover
& T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1041
(1977) (explaining that Warren Court's expansion of habeas corpus was remedial counterpart of its
"constitutionalization of criminal procedure").
32. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (requiring "cause and prejudice" to be shown
to excuse state procedural default); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding Fourth Amendment claims
not cognizable in federal habeas corpus where state court has provided "full and fair" opportunity to litigate
issue); cf. R. Lea Brilmayer, State Forfeiture Rules and Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions, 49
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by inmates to contest the constitutionality of their confinement, habeas corpus
has become instead a device to ensure that state courts comply with federal law
at the time they review a defendant's sentence on direct appeal. Like the exclu-
sionary rule, habeas relief has become a sanction to deter lawless state conduct.
And, since state courts cannot be expected to comply with law that did not exist
at the time they reviewed a prisoner's conviction and sentence, applying new
law retroactively cannot fulfill the habeas remedy's avowed purpose.
Though this conception of the Great Writ expresses a coherent vision, it
will entail dire consequences for capital petitioners. In the pre-Teague world,
a capital defendant whose conviction had become final before the Court an-
nounced a new rule could often still invoke the new rule in order to obtain
relief. In the post-Teague world, however, the rule will be unavailable, and
unless the rule sought falls within one of the two exceptions to Teague's
general bar, a petitioner who can find no basis for relief in "old" law will be
executed.33
2. Expanding the Definition of a "New Rule"
In three cases decided during the 1989 Term, the Court began to unveil
more fully the formidable obstacle Teague presents to capital petitioners. In
Butler v. McKellaP34 and Saffle v. Parks,35 the Court elaborated on what con-
stitutes a "new rule" for purposes of retroactivity. According to the Butler
majority, a rule is a new rule if it is "susceptible to debate among reasonable
minds. ' 36 Any rule based upon a "reasonable, good-faith interpretation of
existing precedent made by state courts" 37 will be judged new. Moreover, what
U. CHI. L. REV. 741, 752 (1982) (commenting that "federal collateral review of procedural defaults has
contracted under the Burger Court").
33. See generally Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Supreme Court's New Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 165, 166-67 (summarizing Teague's impact on habeas doctrine,
theory, and practice). Although Justice Scalia has endorsed Teague's view of retroactivity in the criminal
context, he appears to take a different view of retroactivity in the civil context. See American Trucking
Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). His respective positions
appear irreconcilable because his opinion in American Trucking Associations is premised on a view of the
Constitution that transcends any difference between the criminal and civil contexts. See id. ("Since the
Constitution does not change from year to year since it does not conform to our decisions, but our decisions
are supposed to conform to it: the notion that our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular decision
could take prospective form does not make sense."): cf. John Blume & William Pratt, The Changing Face
of Retroactivity, 58 UMKC L. REV. 581, 591 n.90 (1990) (highlighting inconsistency in Justice Scalia's
position); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1759 n.147 (1991) (noting Blackstonian streak in Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence). But see Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court, the
Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56,62-70 (1965) (discussing symbolic
importance of Blackstonian "declaratory theory" of law).
34. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
35. 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
36. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
37. Id.; see also Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1261 (asserting petitioner seeks new rule if prior cases "inform,
or even control or govern, the analysis of his claim").
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constitutes a "reasonable" interpretation has received a positivistic gloss, much
like the latest gloss on the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine. 38 Under
Teague and its progeny, simply surveying the decisions of the state courts may
establish a rule's status. Whenever a difference of opinion materializes among
state tribunals, the rule is arguably "susceptible to debate among reasonable
minds." It therefore qualifies as "new" and is placed beyond the reach of
capital petitioners seeking habeas relief in federal court.39 At the extreme,
then, a single wayward state court, by reaching a conclusion opposite that
reached by every other state, could place a rule off limits to capital petitioners
on collateral review.40
3. Contracting the Exceptions
While expanding the definition of a "new rule," the Court has at the same
time begun to shrink the two exceptions to Teague. Under the first exception,
even "new" rules "that place an entire category of primary conduct beyond the
reach of the criminal law or ... that prohibit imposition of a certain type of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense" 41 will
be applied retroactively. Indirectly, however, the scope of this exception will
likely be defined not by the Court, but by the states. State legislatures will
enjoy this power because, as previously explained,42 the Eighth Amendment's
substantive limitations, based on the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine,
now derive almost completely from state law. In this way, the first exception
becomes a product, albeit an indirect product, of state legislative action. Thus,
just as state court judges will (indirectly) define when a rule is new, so state
legislatures will (indirectly) determine the availability of Teague's first excep-
tion. Moreover, because state legislatures are nowadays more inclined to expand
than to contract the death penalty's reach, the first exception is unlikely to
provide any significant relief from Teague.43
Like the first, the second exception appears unlikely to provide much
respite from Teague's retroactivity bar. This exception is regulated by principles
appropriated from Justice Harlan's dissenting opinions in Desist v. United
38. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
39. Cf. Butler, 110 S. Ct at 1222 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("State courts essentially are told today that,
save for outright 'illogical' defiance of a binding precedent precisely on point, their interpretations of federal
constitutional guarantees-no matter how cramped and unfaithful to the principles underlying existing
precedent-will no longer be subject to oversight through the federal habeas system.").
40. Cf. Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1265 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing reliance on lower court cases).
41. Sawyer v. Smith, I10 S. Ct. 2822,2831 (1990) (citation omitted). Applied to liability for the death
penalty, as opposed to criminal liability per se, the first exception exempts from Teague's retroactivity bar
defendants whom the Eighth Amendment places beyond the reach of the death penalty because of their status
or offense. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328-29 (1989).
42. See supra notes 6-25 and accompanying text.
43. See generally NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, 1990 SURVEY OF STATE
LEGISLATION (1990) (detailing recent legislative efforts to expand death penalty).
[Vol. 101: 187
Politicizing Who Dies
States44 and Mackey v. United States.45 In Desist, Justice Harlan argued that
a new rule should be applied retroactively whenever it would "significantly im-
prove... pre-existing fact-finding procedures." 46 In Mackey, Harlan amended
and limited his test, urging that a new rule be applied retroactively only where
it required the observance of those procedures that are "'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.' 47 According to Harlan, only those rules that "alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate
the fairness of a particular conviction" 4 should receive retroactive treatment.
In Teague, the Court combined Desist's accuracy element with Mackey's "bed-
rock" requirement to create a two-prong test to govern the second exception.
In Sawyer v. Smith,49 the Court interpreted this two-prong test in a way
that virtually closed the last avenue open against Teague's retroactivity bar.
Sawyer, whose conviction had become final on April 2, 1984, petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that when the prosecutor "argued to the jury
that a sentence of death would be 'merely a recommendation' and that 'others'
would be able to correct the decision if it turned out to be 'wrong,"' 50 he
violated the rule announced in Caldwell v. Mississippi.1 Because Caldwell
was decided on June 11, 1985, some fourteen months after his conviction be-
came final, Sawyer's claim triggered the Teague inquiry. After finding that
Caldwell constituted a "new rule" and that the first exception was unavail-
able,52 Justice Kennedy moved on to the next step in the Teague analysis,
addressing the applicability of the second exception to Caldwell-type errors.
Emphasizing the first prong of the test, Sawyer submitted that the second
exception should include any rule of capital sentencing designed to "'preserve
the accuracy and fairness of capital sentencing judgments."'-3 Such an inter-
pretation, said Justice Kennedy, was unacceptable, for nearly every rule relating
to the penalty phase of a capital trial was designed to enhance accuracy and
fairness. Sawyer's construction would cause the exception to swallow the rule;
in effect, it would make all new rules of capital sentencing retroactive.
Stressing instead the test's second prong, Justice Kennedy explained that
the second exception applies only to "'watershed rules of criminal procedure'
that are necessary to the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding."
Caldwell fell outside the second exception, Justice Kennedy insisted, because
44. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
45. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
46. Desist, 394 U.S. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., dissenting in two judgments and concurring in third) (quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)).
48. Id.
49. 110 S. CL 2822 (1990).
50. Sanyer. 110 S. Ct. at 2833 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
52. Saityer, 110 S. CL at 2828, 2831.
53. Id. at 2831 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 30 (No. 89-5809)).
54. Id.
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it did not involve an essential ingredient of fundamental fairness." Under this
analysis, Caldwell was merely a constitutional bonus granted to capital defen-
dants, an additional but nonfundamental layer of protection beyond that already
available under due process.56 It remains obscure, however, precisely when
a rule is so fundamental that it amounts to a "watershed." At present, the Court
appears to rely on what one observer has dubbed the "Gideon litmus test"57:
a rule falls under the second exception only when it safeguards a right the
Court finds as essential as that sought by Clarence Gideon.58 It would be
sanguine to suppose, then, that the second exception will be available very
often.
As part of the arcane law of habeas corpus, Teague's nonretroactivity
doctrine may appear esoteric, even irrelevant. The doctrine will, however, have
a profound impact on who possesses the power to articulate the norms regulat-
ing the death penalty's application, because it moves power from electorally
immune federal court judges to electorally vulnerable state court judges.
Because lower federal courts do not have the authority to hear state criminal
cases on direct appeal, they can review state criminal proceedings only through
habeas corpus. Teague, however, "deprive[s] the lower federal courts of most
of their opportunities to make 'new law' in federal habeas cases. '59 Whenever
a state-sentenced petitioner seeks a new rule on collateral review, the federal
courts will decline to hear him. Consequently, the evolution of federal criminal
procedure will depend almost exclusively on the dialogue between the state
courts and the Supreme Court-on the few occasions the Court agrees to hear
an appeal on direct review. The conversation between the lower federal
55. Id. at 2831-33. Indeed, faith in due process-fundamental fairness now appears to be a touchstone
for the Court's retrenchment of the heightened protections the Eight Amendment once provided. See, e.g.,
Payne v. Tennessee, I1I S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991) (expressing faith in due process to prevent error); cf.
Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 4 HASTINGS LJ. 941, 1021 (1991) (noting how Court's recent habeas
corpus jurisprudence may reproduce structure of federal-state relations existing under preincorporation
fundamental fairness standard).
56. Cf. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (indicating further limitation on Caldwell by
requiring showing "that the remarks to the jury improperly describel] the role assigned to the jury by local
law") (emphasis added).
57. Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 24 (1990)
(referring to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
58. Id.
59. Hoffmann, supra note 33, at 191. The lower federal courts will be able to formulate and apply new
rules of constitutional criminal procedure only in federal prosecutions or when the rule falls within one of
Teague's exceptions. Id. at 192. Inasmuch as Teague is meant to protect the interests of the state, federal
courts may formulate and apply new rules where the state waives Teague. Cf. Collins v. Youngblood, 110
S. Ct. 2715,2718 (1990) ("Although the Teague rule is grounded in important considerations of federal-state
relations, we think it is not 'jurisdictional' in the sense that this Court, despite a limited grant of certiorari,
must raise and decide the issue sua sponte.") (citation omitted); Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away at
the Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced Federal Habeas Corpus Petitioners Be Able to Seek and Utilize
Changes in the Law?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357, 411 (1990-1991) (arguing that Teague is
waivable).
60. See, e.g., Hoffmann, supra note 33, at 192: Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity and
Crystal Balls: Predicting the Course of Constitutional Law, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 115, 179 (1991); Weisberg,
supra note 57, at 32; cf. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 31, at 1046-68 (discussing how habeas corpus
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courts and the High Court will dwindle, and with the Supreme Court as the
only federal interlocutor, the dialogue between the state courts and the federal
courts will become one-sided. In short, Teague's net institutional effect will be
to divest the lower federal courts of their power to articulate norms of constitu-
tional criminal procedure, including the norms governing the death-selection
process.6 1 In the post-Teague era, with the federal courts thus displaced, the
power to elaborate constitutional norms of criminal procedure will fall to state
appellate tribunals-judicial bodies that are more exposed to the pressures of
local politics than are the federal courts.62
II. ALLOCATING DEATH-SELECTION POWER TO POLITICS
The flow of norm-selection power to politics has been accompanied by a
parallel flow of power over death-selection to politics. Politics, therefore, will
influence not only the norms governing the capital sentencing process, but also
the selection of who, subject to those norms, will die.
A. "Quasi-Mandatory" Statutes
In general, a state legislature can exert its influence over who dies through
the rules it enacts to structure and constrain the jury's deliberations during the
penalty phase. The legislature can appropriate death-selection power to itself
most directly by adopting legal rules that mandate death under certain circum-
creates dialogue over constitutional doctrine).
61. See. e.g.. Hoffmann, supra note 33, at 190-92; Patchel, supra note 55, at 1009; cf. Marc M. Arkin,
The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371,
391 (1991) (finding that most lower federal courts have construed Teague's bar broadly). Lately, the Court
has fortified a host of procedural barriers preventing federal courts from reaching the claims of capital
petitioners on the merits. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, Ill S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (stating that "federal
claims must fairly appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law" before
presumption favoring federal jurisdiction applies and overruling Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963));
McCleskey v. Zant, I11 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (applying cause-and-prejudice test to abusive claims in
successive petitions); Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990) (holding federal courts required to apply
deferential Jackson standard in determining whether state court has followed state law); Demosthenes v.
Baal, 110 S. Ct. 2223 (1990) (holding state court's finding of condemned prisoner's competency to waive
postconviction litigation entitled to presumption of correctness); cf Delo v. Stokes, 110 S. Ct. 1880, 1882
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (inviting states to apply to Court to vacate stays of execution when federal
courts of appeals fail to protect them "from the consequences of a stay entered without an adequate basis");
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990) (holding death-row inmate did not have standing in his
individual capacity or as "next friend" to litigate whether Eighth Amendment requires automatic direct
appeal in capital case where defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived right to appeal
conviction and sentence).
However, to the extent that the law of habeas corpus continues to require federal courts to determine
whether a capital defendant is "innocent" of the death penalty for purposes of procedural default, of abuse
of the writ, and (perhaps) of retroactivity, the federal courts retain an important, though very limited, role
in capital sentencing. See. e.g.. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1986); cf. Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas
Corpus as a Safety Value for hInocence, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 415 (1990-1991) (arguing
that federal courts can always intervene to prevent execution of defendant who is "actually innocent" of
death sentence imposed on him).
62. See hifra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
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stances.63 Hitherto disapproving rules of this genre, the Court has now em-
braced a muted version of them, thereby handing to state legislatures a modest,
but disturbing, share of the power to select who dies.
1. Rejecting Mandatory Statutes
In Furman v. Georgia,' decided in 1972, the Court invalidated capital
sentencing systems vesting the sentencer with complete discretion to impose
life or death. Discretionary systems, the Court believed, rendered the death
63. A state legislature can also draw power toward itself through the kinds of rules it enacts and through
the ways it structures their interaction. First, it can enact vague and open textured rules that, although unable
to constrain meaningfully the jury's discretion, operate nonetheless as a legal peg upon which the jury can
hang responsibility. The jury can rationalize that the rule required the result. The most notorious rule of
this kind is the "catch all" aggravator found in most death penalty statutes, authorizing death if the crime
was "outrageously heinous, atrocious, or cruel," or some variation on that basic theme. The Court has
required state courts to impose a limiting construction on these aggravators. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion); accord Shell v. Mississippi, Ill S. Ct. 313 (1990) (per curiam);
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). It continues to be unclear, however, just how vigorously the
Court will enforce this requirement. See, e.g.. Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990) (finding limiting
construction sufficient); Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990) (same). See generally Richard A. Rosen,
The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C.
L. REV. 941 (1986) (arguing state courts' limiting constructions on "catch-all" aggravators do not constrain
discretion).
Second, the legislature can through its capital statute ask the jury to decide whether or not the
defendant will pose a future danger, either to society at large or to a prison population. See, e.g., Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262,269 (1976) (plurality opinion). The state usually frames the issue of future dangerous-
ness as a question mental health experts are especially qualified to answer. This aggravating circumstance
therefore invites the jury to delegate its obligation to gauge the defendant's future dangerousness to a
psychiatrist or other mental health professional. Obliged to judge the worth of another human being's life,
jurors naturally might be eager to defer to expert opinion. See generally Claudia M. Worrell, Psychiatric
Prediction of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing: The Quest for Innocent Authority, 5 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 433, 438-43 (1987) (discussing factors prompting jurors to defer to psychiatrists). Unfortunately, the
evidence suggests that expert opinion, like lay opinion, will be wrong more often than it will be right. See,
e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916-22 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (reporting evidence that
psychiatric testimony about future dangerousness is wrong two times out of three). Some mental health
professionals play regular cameo roles for the prosecution at capital trials. Dr. James Grigson, also known
as Dr. Death, is perhaps the most infamous in this respect. See. e.g.. Cameron Barr, Paging Dr. Death, AM.
LAW., Mar. 1989, at 165; They Call Him Dr. Death, TIME, June 1. 1981, at 64. Moreover, not only does
the future dangerousness aggravator transfer responsibility to an expert, it also makes what is essentially
a moral decision look like a scientific one. In this way the laws of science can be made to assume
responsibility. Cf. ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS 72-91 (1979) (discussing Milgram
experiment); HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE (1989) (examining social
psychology surrounding immoral or illegal acts committed under orders from authority); STANLEY MILGRAM,
OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974).
Finally, the legislature can arrange the relationship between the rules so as to achieve "double
counting." That is, it can make a particular factor both a statutory aggravating circumstance and an element
in the definition of capital murder. Under this scheme, a defendant who is convicted of capital murder will
already be death eligible when he reaches the penalty phase. See. e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231
(1988) (finding no constitutional defect where sole aggravating circumstance found by jury at penalty phase
duplicates element of underlying capital crime); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE
INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 115 (2d ed. 198 1) (discussing double counting); Robert Weisberg,
Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305.330-31 (same). Another form of double counting occurs when
the same underlying facts satisfy two or more aggravators. See. e.g.. Valerie P. Hans, Death By Jury, in
CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 149, 165 (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988).
64. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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penalty too unpredictable. Receiving a death sentence, said Justice Stewart, was
as random as "being struck by lighting."6 5 In response to Furman, several
states enacted mandatory statutes, i.e., statutes designed to trigger a death
sentence automatically once a jury convicted a defendant of capital murder.
Under this legal regime, any defendant falling within a statutorily defined
description would be sentenced to death, no matter how extenuating the circum-
stances. By decreeing death whenever a defendant satisfies certain legislative
standards, mandatory statutes direct the power to decide who dies away from
the jury and toward the legislature.
Though conceived as a way to satisfy Furman's insistence on predictability
and consistency in capital sentencing, mandatory statutes were nonetheless
invalidated when, four years after Furman, they came before the Court in
Woodson v. North Carolina66 and Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana.7 The
Court found these statutes constitutionally intolerable because, however narrow-
ly drafted, they failed to treat the defendant as a unique human being. Any legal
rule abstracts from particularity,68 and a legal rule that automatically imposes
death must more or less regard capital defendants as an "undifferentiated mass
to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death."69 While manda-
tory statutes might have made the administration of the death penalty more
consistent and more predictable, they also denied "the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment." 70
2. Embracing "Quasi-Mandatory" Statutes
Recently, the Court has cast doubt on the vitality of Woodson and its proge-
ny. In two cases decided last year, Blystone v. Pennsylvania71 and Boyde v.
California,72 the Court approved schemes that again require the jury to impose
death under certain statutorily defined circumstances. The petitioner in Blystone,
for example, challenged Pennsylvania's capital statute, charging that it unconsti-
tutionally bound the jury to impose death once it found the existence of at least
one aggravating circumstance and failed to find any mitigating circumstances
65. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
66. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
67. 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (holding
mandatory death penalty for prison inmate convicted of murder while serving life sentence without
possibility of parole unconstitutional); Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam)
(holding mandatory death penalty for killing of police officer unconstitutional).
68. Cf. Weisberg, supra note 63, at 323 ("[Sltatutory descriptions of behavior, however finely drawn,
are still generalizations.").
69. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
70. Id.
71. 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990).
72. 110 S. Ct 1190 (1990).
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to offset it.73 Similarly, the petitioner in Boyde objected that the jurors in his
case returned a death sentence after being instructed that they "shall impose"
death if aggravators outweighed mitigators.74 These arrangements, the petition-
ers argued, were unconstitutional because they were "quasi-mandatory" and
forced the jurors to impose death, albeit under relatively narrow circumstances.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, was unimpressed. There
was nothing constitutionally offensive in either arrangement, he reasoned,
because both statutes still required the jury to consider and give effect to
whatever mitigating evidence the defendant chose to present.75 For the Chief
Justice, Woodson's demand that the defendant be treated as a unique individual
was a narrow imperative. It required only that the state erect no bar to the
defendant's right to introduce mitigating evidence. 6 Where mitigating evi-
dence was not presented or was insufficient to offset the aggravators, the state
was free to compel the jury to honor the outcome of its calculus. Under these
circumstances, the law itself would make the jurors' choice for them.
For the dissenters, to be treated as an individual, as Woodson required,
meant more than the bare right to introduce mitigating evidence. 77 For even
though quasi-mandatory statutes left the defendant's ability to present mitigating
evidence unimpeded, they nonetheless forced the jury's hand where the murder
was aggravated and where, for whatever reason, the defendant submitted no
mitigating evidence. Yet under these limited circumstances, the jury might still
believe that death was unwarranted in a particular case, either because it
thought the aggravators alone were insufficiently weightY78 or, perhaps, be-
cause it was moved to mercy. Moreover, a quasi-mandatory legislative rule of
decision will produce a pattern of death sentences that is objectionable in a
comparative sense.79 For example, where no mitigating evidence is proffered,
the Pennsylvania statute requires that the jury impose death upon a defendant
who raped and tortured his victim as well as upon one who killed during the
course of a thirteen dollar robbery, since both murders were committed in "the
perpetration of a felony." 80 Premised on the assumption that all aggravators
describe equally morally repugnant conduct, quasi-mandatory statutes bleach
out any morally relevant difference between these two defendants.
73. See generally Bruce S. Ledewitz, The Requirement of Death: Mandatory Language in the
Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute, 21 DUQ. L. REv. 103, 136-56 (1982) (arguing quasi-mandatory statutes
fail to satisfy constitutional demand for reliability in capital sentencing).
74. Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1195.
75. See Blystone, I10 S. Ct. at 1082.
76. See id. at 1082-84.
77. Cf. id. at 1089 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 1088-89.
79. On the distinction between comparative and noncomparative justice, see JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY 98-99 (1973).




Quasi-mandatory statutes represent a weaker version of their unqualified,
pre-Woodson predecessors. Nonetheless, their object is still to shift death-
selection power, however marginally, from the jury to the legislature. They
"substitute[] a legislative judgment about the severity of a crime for a jury's
determination that the death penalty is appropriate for the individual."'" In
states that enact quasi-mandatory statutes, capital defendants will begin to lose
their particularity in the eyes of the law, shading into the "faceless, undiffer-
entiated mass"82 described so disparagingly in Woodson.
B. An "Appellate Jury"
Just as the Court has allocated power over the death-selection decision to
state legislatures, it has concomitantly delegated death-selection power to state
appellate courts. In a series of decisions culminating in Clemons v. Mississip-
pi,83 the Court has, as a matter of constitutional law, transformed each state
appellate court into what in reality amounts to another sentencing jury. After
Clemons, a defendant may find his fate settled in the first instance not by a
jury, but by a distant appellate court.
1. The Path to Clemons
The origins of the appellate jury may be traced to Zant v. Stephens,84 a
1983 case. The respondent in Stephens was sentenced to death in Georgia.
Subsequently, in an unrelated case, the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated one
of the aggravating circumstances on which Stephens' death sentence had been
based.85 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld Stephens' death sen-
tence, despite the existence of the invalid aggravator. Reversing the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Geor-
gia court's decision to uphold the sentence rather than to vacate it and remand
for resentencing.86
81. Blystonev. Pennsylvania, I1OS. Ct. 1078, 1088 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Texas capital
sentencing scheme is also quasi-mandatory. See, e.g., Gillers, supra note 1, at 1075 (discussing Texas'
"cryptomandatory death law"). Under it, "the law has predetermined what the punishment will be depending
only on certain conditions. The jury, as factfinder, only determines whether those conditions exist. The judge
then pronounces sentence as the law requires." Hernandez v. State, 757 S.W.2d 744, 751 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988) (en banc) (emphasis added). Based on this description of the statute, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals could reach the remarkable conclusion that in Texas "nobody assesses punishment in a capital case."
Id. (emphasis added). The law alone condemns. I am indebted to Robert McGlasson for this reference.
82. Woodson v. North Carolina. 428 U.S. 280. 304 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Walton v. Arizona,
110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990), however, Justice Scalia announced his intention to uphold mandatory statutes should
the states again feel the need to resort to them. See id. at 3068 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment). Justice Stevens considered Justice Scalia's position "reactionary." Id. at 3092 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
83. 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990).
84. 462 U.S. 862 (1983): see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
85. See Stephens, 462 U.S. at 867 (citing Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386, 391-92 (Ga. 1976)).
86. Id. at 891.
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In "threshold states," such as Georgia, aggravators serve only to define the
threshold past which a defendant becomes "death eligible." Once the jury finds
the presence of a single aggravator, the defendant crosses the threshold and
enters the death-eligible class. The jury thereafter possesses almost wholly
unfettered discretion to consider whatever evidence it believes is relevant to its
decision.87 It is not required to weigh aggravators against mitigators. The
Court in Stephens therefore reasoned that although the defendant's death
sentence rested in part on an invalid aggravator, he was still within the death-
eligible class because two other aggravators remained to push him across the
critical threshold.88 Moreover, the evidence that had been introduced under
the invalid aggravator's auspices would have been admissible on other
grounds.89 So although the Georgia Supreme Court no doubt reevaluated the
validity of Stephens' sentence, it second-guessed the sentencing jury's decision
only insofar as it decided that attaching a legal label to otherwise admissible
aggravating evidence made no material difference to the eventual outcome.90
The jury's decision, the Georgia Supreme Court speculated, would have been
the same, even if the invalid aggravator had never been formally presented to
them.9"
By authorizing state tribunals to revisit the jury's delicate sentencing
calculus only where the legal label "aggravating" had been improperly attached
to admissible evidence, Stephens appeared at the time to be an innocuous,
almost unnoticeable, grant of death-selection power to state courts. Yet five
years later, in Satterwhite v. Texas,92 the Court expressly sanctioned what had
been dormant in Stephens: the application of harmless error analysis to constitu-
tional errors in capital sentencing. 3 Satterwhite protested that he had been
87. Before last Term, the jury was required to focus on the nature of both the offender and the offense.
See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). The state could not introduce evidence regarding the impact
of the victim's death on family and friends, see Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), nor could the
prosecutor comment on the personal characteristics of the victim. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S.
805 (1989). In Payne v. Tennessee, I11 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), the Court overturned Booth and Gathers, at
least insofar as they barred the state from introducing evidence about the victim. The Court reserved
judgment on the admissibility of evidence relating to the victim's survivors' "characterizations and opinions
about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence." Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2.
88. See Stephens, 462 U.S. at 878-80.
89. See id. at 886.
90. See Id. at 891. But cf. id. at 905 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("There is no way of knowing whether
the jury would have sentenced respondent to death if its attention had not been drawn to the unconstitutional
statutory factor.").
91. Id. at 888-89 (discussing Zant v. Stephens, 297 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ga. 1982)); see also Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939 (1983) (upholding death sentence despite trial court's consideration of aggravator not available
under state law); Goode v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 78 (1983) (per curiam) (same).
92. 486 U.S. 249 (1988).
93. In the interim, the Court had delegated death-selection power to state appellate courts in a more
indirect fashion. In Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1982), the Court authorized state appellate courts to
make the factual finding that a capital defendant who had been convicted on a felony-murder theory had
"killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill." The Court had earlier held in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982), that this factual finding must be made before a felony-murder defendant could be sentenced
to death. As a factual question, the Enmund inquiry would ordinarily be within the province of the jury.
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examined by a state-appointed psychiatrist without first having been informed
of his right to counsel. Because under the Texas capital sentencing statute the
results of a psychiatrist's examination may be used to demonstrate future
dangerousness-the key determinant of life or death under the Texas
scheme-the examination violated Satterwhite's Sixth Amendment rights.9 5
The Supreme Court agreed with Satterwhite that Texas had violated his right
to counsel but nonetheless endorsed the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals to subject that constitutional violation to harmless error analysis.
Though the Court ultimately found the error not harmless, 96 had it initially
treated the violation as reversible per se there would have been no need to
guess how the unconstitutionally obtained psychiatric testimony weighed upon
the jury's mind. As Justice Marshall emphasized in dissent, when an appellate
court applies harmless error analysis to the sentencing determination in a capital
case, it "substitute[s] its judgment of what the sentencer would have done in
the absence of constitutional error for an actual judgment of the sentencer
untainted by constitutional error."97
2. Clemons v. Mississippi
When a state appellate court applies harmless error analysis to the death-
selection decision, some deference is still paid to the jury's initial judgment,
because under Chapman v. California98 the error must be harmless "beyond
a reasonable doubt." 99 Yet this last remaining degree of deference appears
finally to have been withdrawn in Clemons v. Mississippi.1° Unlike in Geor-
gia, where aggravators serve only to define the death-eligible threshold, in
Mississippi aggravating circumstances must be weighed against mitigating
circumstances. Only if aggravators outweigh mitigators is the jury authorized,
though not required, to impose death. The jury in Clemons sentenced the
defendant to death after having found two aggravating circumstances and no
mitigating circumstances that outweighed them.
94. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 63, at 114-15.
95. Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 254; see also Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989) (per curiam) (holding
state's use of psychiatric testimony on issue of future dangerousness violated Sixth Amendment where
defense counsel was not notified that examination by psychiatrist would be used for that purpose); Estelle
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding testimony of psychiatrist based upon court-ordered psychiatric
examination where defendant not advised of constitutional rights violated Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments).
96. See Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 258.
97. Id. at 263 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error, 88 COLtI. L. REV. 79, 82 (1988) ("[Elxisting understandings of harmless error
standards enable appellate courts to perform fact-finding functions that the sixth amendment entrusts to a
jury.").
98. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
99. Id. at 24. See generally James C. Scoville, Note, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital
Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 740, 754-58 (1987) (arguing harmless error doctrine inapplicable to capital
sentencing because appellate courts are institutionally unable to apply Chapman test).
100. 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990).
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On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court invalidated one of the
aggravating circumstances used to condemn Clemons. The court found the
"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravator unconstitutionally vague.'"'
Yet rather than remand for resentencing, the Mississippi high court decided to
salvage Clemons' death sentence by reevaluating the evidence itself and
concluding that death was warranted. With four Justices dissenting, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the state court's decision to recalculate the
sentence anew rather than to remand. Nothing in the Court's capital jurispru-
dence, Justice White wrote, prevented the Mississippi Supreme Court from
independently reassessing Clemons' sentence. The Mississippi court was free
to reweigh the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating ones for
itself.0 2
The dissenters thought otherwise. In their view, when an appellate court
acts as Clemons authorizes it to act, it ceases to be an appellate court. It has
instead "assumed for itself the role of sentencer."'1 3 For Justice Blackmun,
"[t]he logical implication of the majority's approach"'" was unmistakable.
After Clemons, he said, "no trial-level sentencing procedure need be conducted
at all. Instead, the record of a capital trial (including a sentencing hearing
conducted before a court reporter) might as well be shipped to the appellate
court, which then would determine the appropriate sentence in the first in-
stance.""0 5 Convinced that an appellate court could apply the death penalty as
consistently and reliably as a jury, the Clemons majority turned a blind eye to
the need for capital sentencing to be sensitive to "the diverse frailties of
humankind," 0 6 intangibles an appellate court cannot hope to give their due.
"[A] sentence of death," Justice Blackmun observed, "should be pronounced
by a decisionmaker who will look upon the face of the defendant as he renders
judgment."'0 7 Appellate sentencing, he wrote, was a "bloodless alterna-
tive"' 8 to the jury, an alternative which streamlined the process, but at an
"intolerable"' 1 9 cost.
101. Id. at 1452 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding "catch all" aggravating circumstance requires limiting construction)
(plurality opinion); accord Shell v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990) (per curiam); Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356 (1988).
102. See Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1449; accord Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731, 738 (1991); Johnson
v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 591 (1988) (White, J., concurring).
103. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1456 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
107. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1460 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Caldwell
v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985) ("[Ain appellate court, unlike a capital sentencing jury, is wholly
ill-suited to evaluate the appropriateness of death in the first instance.").
108. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1460 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id. at 1461.
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III. DEATH AND POLITICS
The decision who dies can be analyzed as two distinct elements: norm
selection and death selection. With each decision, the Court's recent jurispru-
dence has delivered the power to decide who dies more and more into the
hands of actors beholden to politics. There are compelling reasons to believe,
however, that once politics has decided to install the death penalty in the first
place, its role in the penalty's administration should come to an end. For when
politics selects the constitutional norms meant to confine the death penalty, the
Eighth Amendment is drained of its integrity as a constitutional principle. And
when politics selects who dies, the humanity of the condemned is diminished,
and diminished with it, ultimately, is our own.
A. Politicizing Norm Selection
Constitutional adjudication does not take place in a political vacuum. The
reigning values and sentiments of the day, or perhaps of yesterday, are bound
to leave their mark on the face of constitutional doctrine. However, it is
axiomatic that a constitution, especially a bill of rights, is rendered idle to the
extent that its content is made to depend directly on the fallout from ordinary
partisan politics. When the Court structures doctrine in a way that empowers
state legislatures to define constitutional norms, those norms begin to lose their
status as constitutional norms. They become something less. Where the norms
at stake are also those governing the death penalty, the potential erosion of
constitutional protections becomes acute. Nearly eighty percent of the popula-
tion voice support for capital punishment in some form or another.110 To
delegate norm selection to state legislatures under these circumstances will
inevitably jeopardize the Eighth Amendment's ability to act as a meaningful
check on the majority's impulse, born of fear and frustration, to execute.
The Eighth Amendment's integrity is likewise at risk when the power to
select norms is removed from the federal courts and entrusted largely to state
appellate courts. Champions of the federal courts, boasting the federal courts'
institutional insularity, esprit de corps, and expertise on federal questions, tend
to impute to all federal courts at all times preeminence over state courts. Any
suggestion of parity, they say, is a myth."' For their part, champions of state
courts avoid romanticizing the federal bench. Some believe, moreover, that the
poor showing of Southern state courts during the civil rights movement has
110. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Capital Punishment Gaining Favor as Public Seeks Retribution, WAsH.
POST, May 17, 1990, at A12 (reporting 1988 Gallup poll found 79% of Americans support death penalty).
But see William J. Bowers, The Death Penalty's Shaky Support, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1990, at A21
(claiming support for death penalty not as strong as polls suggest).
11. E.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); see also Gary Peller,
In Defense of Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579, 666-68 (1982).
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unduly tarnished their standing. t2 From this perspective, it is unsurprising
that state courts have not in general embarked on any bold initiatives. With
federal courts filling the field, it would be inexpedient for state courts to expend
needlessly their limited institutional capital on the protection of federal rights.
Treated as second-class citizens, state courts have lived up, or down, to what
has been expected of them. Only when power is granted, champions of state
courts say, can its responsible exercise begin to follow. t1 3
When the question of parity is considered in the abstract, it admits no sure
resolution."4 Placed in a more specific context, however, the question as-
sumes a more manageable form. Where the death penalty supplies the context,
experience suggests that the institutional limitations on state courts, combined
with the overwhelming support the death penalty currently enjoys, make it
improvident to trust wholly in the capacity of state courts to safeguard the
rights of capital petitioners. While it is true that a number of state supreme
courts have reawakened their state constitutions in order to reinvigorate some
of the rights weakened by the Supreme Court,"5 this renaissance has not
reached the death penalty. Only rarely have state courts found the death penalty
offensive to state constitutional norms."6 And, not unexpectedly, popular re-
112. See. e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 605, 631 (1981); cf. G. ALAN TARR & MARY PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND
NATION 74-82 (1988) (describing Alabama Supreme Court's response to civil rights movement). But see
Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An
Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 213, 225 n.62 (1983) (suggesting
conventional wisdom may exaggerate degree of state supreme court hostility toward civil rights litigants).
113. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 n.33 (1982) ("Over the long term ... federal
intrusions may seriously undermine the morale of our state judges."); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441,506 (1963) ("The crucial issue
is the possible damage done to the inner sense of responsibility, to the pride and conscientiousness, of a
state judge in doing what is, after all, under the constitutional scheme a part of his business: the decision
of federal questions properly raised in state litigation.").
114. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Rolefor the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA
L. REV. 233, 260 (1988) (questioning usefulness of evaluations which treat state and federal courts as
aggregates).
115. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977): Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State
Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731 (1982): Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills
of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271 (1973).
116. See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal.) (holding death penalty violates state constitution),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980) (same). In
each case, the electorate responded with an amendment to the state constitution reinstating the death penalty.
See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXVI. The people of Oregon have also constitution-
alized capital punishment in response to judicial action. See Katherine H. Waldo, The 1984 Oregon Death
Penalty Initiatives: A State ConstitutionalAnalysis, 22 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 285,288-89 (1986) (explaining
how recent initiatives try to insulate death penalty from state constitutional challenge). In light of this history,
it is hardly surprising that state court opposition to the death penalty is voiced more often only in dissent.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 397 N.E.2d 809, 816 (Ill. 1979) (Ryan, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 953 (1980): Adams v. State, 271 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ind. 1971) (DeBruler, J., concurring
and dissenting), modified, 284 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. 1972); McKenzie v. Osborne, 640 P.2d 368, 383 (Mont.
1981) (Shea, J., dissenting); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 300 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., dissenting); State
v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tenn.) (Brock, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981); State
v. Rupe, 683 P.2d 571, 598 (Wash. 1984) (Dolliver, J., concurring in result); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d
79, 172 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922
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sponse to these actions has been uniformly hostile. When a state court has
ventured to abolish the penalty as repugnant to the state constitution, the people
have amended the document, embedding the penalty in the state's supreme law
and insulating it from judicial review. Even when state courts have tried to be
more circumspect, reversing death sentences on a case-by-case basis rather than
gambling on wholesale abolition, the lack of executions has drawn public atten-
tion sooner or later. The offending judges have sometimes been removed in
retention elections, though veiled hints alone have usually sufficed to secure
compliance with popular will." 7 Lacking the institutional wherewithal of the
federal courts, state judges must either relent or face ouster.
The Rehnquist Court continues to be impatient with the pleas of capital
petitioners, and the motif of its recent decisions instructs the lower federal
courts to issue the Great Writ sparingly."n Yet the alternative to federal court
oversight-bestowing upon the state courts stewardship of the rights of death-
sentenced inmates-promises an even darker future for the Eighth Amendment.
B. Politicizing Death Selection
Because "death is qualitatively different"1"9 from other punishments, the
Court has come to recognize that the sentence imposed at the penalty stage
must "reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, charac-
ter, and crime."'' 0 The principle that each defendant is to be treated "with
that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual" ' i in turn requires
the sentencing authority itself to possess certain characteristics. Two features
in particular foster, though do not guarantee, that the sentence imposed will be
a moral product: moral independence and moral proximity. State legislatures
(1982).
117. The ouster of Chief Justice Bird and two of her "liberal" colleagues from the California Supreme
Court is a vivid illustration of the perils state court judges face when they manage to shut down the death-
selection process. See John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: the Campaign,
the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987) (discussing campaign
to remove Chief Justice Bird); cf. Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1295 n.8 (9th Cir.) (en banc)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989) ("The recent experience of California's
Supreme Court forcefully shows that the system of direct election of judges can impose public opinion upon
'politically neutral' constitutional interpretation."). Until very recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court had
reversed every death sentence on appeal. It affirmed its first death sentence at the same time that its actions
were coming under political scrutiny. See, e.g., Joseph F. Sullivan, New Jersey's High Court Upholds Death
Sentence After Blocking 26, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1991, at Al. See generally Ronald J. Tabak, The Death
Of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 797, 846-47 (1986) (describing backlash experienced by state court judges who appear
to oppose death penalty).
118. See cases cited supra note 61: cf. Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Chilling Capital Appeals,
NAT'L LJ., Mar. 11, 1991, at I (Justice Scalia, in capacity as administrative justice of Fifth Circuit, will
no longer grant extensions of time for filing petition for writ of certiorari in capital cases where delay has
occurred because petitioner had no lawyer).
119. Woodson v. North Carolina. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
120. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586. 605 (1978).
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and state appellate courts lack both these attributes. Thus, the more we delegate
death-selection power to these actors, the more we threaten to disregard the
humanity of the condemned.
The power to decide who dies carries with it a "truly awesome responsi-
bility."'" For responsibility to be meaningful and tangible, however, the
power to sentence must be vested in an authority who is morally independent.
That is, it must be vested in a sentencing authority free to render her decision
according to her own conscience and convictions.11 Where politically respon-
sible actors make the death-selection decision, however, moral independence
is seriously attenuated, if not foregone altogether. Political considerations crowd
out, or mix with, moral ones, thereby tainting the deliberative process and
destroying the moral credentials of the product. Being subject to political
pressures, neither state legislatures nor state appellate courts can ever fully
possess the virtue of moral independence."
Moral proximity, the imperative that he who sits in judgment look upon
he who is to be judged and possibly condemned, is another attribute of a
morally responsive and responsible sentencer. As Justice Blackmun has said,
to treat a defendant as a human being "surely requires a sentencer who con-
fronts him in the flesh.""t  Neither state legislatures nor appellate courts,
however, will ever confront those whom they would condemn. State legislators
enact statutes that condemn descriptions of people, not real people. No descrip-
tion can anticipate all the imponderables that a sentencer must consider in order
for her decision to be a moral one. Similarly, a state appellate court is too
distant and aloof, however much moral imagination its members bring to their
task. A jury, in contrast, is free to consider in its sentencing determination a
host of intangibles-few, if any, of which an appellate record can adequately
convey.1 The prospect that an appellate court, sitting calmly and with de-
tachment, will feel toward the condemned any "shuddering recognition of kin-
122. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971).
123. Cf Stanton D. Krauss, Representing the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity
Cases and Capital Sentencing, 64 IND. L.L 617, 618 (1989) (describing members of capital juries as "free
agents").
124. The 1990 gubernatorial contests in Texas, California, and Florida offer glimpses into the new
politics of death, a politics generating its own brand of dark one-upmanship. E.g., Richard Lacayo, The
Politics of Life and Death, TIME, Apr. 2, 1990, at 18; see also Lucy Howard & Ned Zeman, 1-800-Death,
NEWsWEEK, July 8, 1991, at 6 (reporting state senator established toll-free number so death penalty boosters
could register support for execution of Harold Otey); cf. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Clemency in
Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CIIANcE 255, 270 (1990-1991) (observing that governors often
commute death sentences only when they no longer have future political ambitions); Daniel T. Kobil, The
Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestling Pardoning Powerfrom the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 607-10 (1991)
(recounting how political pressures have influenced certain clemency decisions); Paul W. Cobb, Jr., Note,
Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Sentencing, 99 YALE L.J. 389, 394 (1989) (describing how
"political considerations" have led many governors to deny clemency). New York Governor Mario Cuomo,
who has repeatedly vetoed bills that seek to reinstate the death penalty in New York, is a courageous
exception to the rule. See. e.g., The Politics of Death, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 1990, at 45, 46.
125. Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1460 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
126. See. e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985).
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ship,"' 7 recognition necessary for a "reasoned moral response," seems re-
mote.
CONCLUSION
The Court's recent death penalty jurisprudence is conspicuous for the way
it has remitted to politics, both over norm and death selection, the power to
decide who dies. Decisional power has by degrees been consigned to state
legislatures and state appellate courts, moving away from juries and the federal
courts. Norm selection and death selection are thus vested to a larger extent in
institutions that are politically-electorally accountable. The power to decide who
dies has, consequently, been brought closer to "We the People." For the un-
abashed democrat, these trends may be cause for celebration. It is, however,
important to acknowledge and understand the risks involved when we politicize
the way we decide who dies. In an enterprise where our common humanity is
already in jeopardy, to allocate to politics even more power to decide who dies
can in the end only worsen our odds.
127. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,520 n. 17 (1968) (quoting ARTHUR KOESTLER, REFLECTIONS
ON HANGING 166-67 (1956)).
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